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FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
PROSECUTORS' DISCRETION
L. B. ScHwAR-rz*
National criminal jurisdiction, which now ranges from treason to hunting
offenses, occupying approximately one quarter of the federal judges' time,' had its
meager beginnings before the birth of constitutional federal government itself. The
Articles of Confederation provided that "the United States in Congress assembled,
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas ... , The Constitution
defined treason and expressly authorized Congress to punish the counterfeiting of
United States securities and coins, as well as piracies and felonies on the high seas
and offenses against the law of nations3 But the great bulk of federal criminal
activity rests upon the constitutional power of Congress to enact laws "necessary and
proper" to the execution of specifically conferred powers, for there are no common-
law crimes in federal jurisprudence. 4 The first federal criminal legislation, antedating
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1 This estimate is based upon discussion with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and several judges, district attorneys, and clerks. Available statistics compare only the numbers of civil
and criminal cases, e.g., in 194x, a fairly typical year between prohibition and price control, 29,090
criminal cases and 28,9o9 civil cases were instituted in the eighty-four district courts. A'INUAL. REIOnT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMtNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1947), Tables :1 and
io, pp. 92 and 113. For comparison of civil and criminal case activity in recent years, see Charts I and
5 of the same REPORT, following pp. 29 and 35.
The range of federal criminal enforcement is indicated in the classification, by offense, of the
31,114 cases instituted in 1947. The most active categories were:
Fraud and other theft .............................. 7082
Im migration ........................................... 7029
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act ........................ 3244
Liquor (internal revenue) ............................... 3078
Narcotics ........................................... 1726
Price control ........................................... 1454
juvenile delinquency ........... ........................ x261
Selective service ........................................ Ix 86
Migratory bird offenses ................................. 621
Other high-frequency categories included Motor Carrier Act violations, interstate transportation of
women for immoral purposes, stowaway offenses, impersonation of federal officials, labor standards
offenses, robbery and firearms offenses. Id., Table D-2.
The A. L. I. study of THE BusINEss OF THE FEDERAL CoURTs (1934) shows a gradual increase in
criminal cases from about 5,000 in 1875 to about 15,ooo a year from 1898 to 1917, after which the
curve moves upwards once more to the prohibition peak of over 9o,ooo in x932. See Chart, p. 35, and
Table, p. 107.
"Articles of Confederation (1777) Art. IX, U. S. Code (940) p. xxv.
'Art. 1, §8, Art. III, §3.
'U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 28 Fed. Cas. 774, No. 16,766 (C. C. Pa. 1798); U. S. v. Hudson, 7
Cranch 32 (U. S. 1812); U. S. v. Coolidge, i Wheat. 415 (U. S. 1816).
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even the creation of federal courts, punished revenue frauds.5 Direct interferences
with federal justice (e.g., perjury in a federal court, bribery of a federal judge) were
dealt with in the Act of April 30, 179o, "for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
against the United States."' By 1825, federal law extended to arson of a federal
vessel (but only if "out of the jurisdiction of any particular State"), extortion by a
federal officer, and theft by an employee from the Bank of the United States.7
Not until after the Civil War did the federal criminal law make its first substantial
ventures beyond the punishment of acts directly injurious to the central government.
With two pieces of reconstruction legislation, the nation was launched upon
the course of employing federal sanctions to protect private individuals from invasion
of their rights by other private individuals-a traditional function of state law. In
the Civil Rights legislation' individuals were protected, under certain circumstances
creating federal jurisdiction, against assault, murder, and threats. The Post Office
Code of 1872 afforded the protection of federal criminal law against moral corruption
and financial depredation, upon a showing that postal facilities had been used to pro-
mote fraud or lotteries, or to disseminate obscenity.9 It was during this period also
that Congress provided for the removal to the federal courts of state proceedings,
civil or criminal, "against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial
tribunals of the State" his equal civil rights as a citizen of the United States,'0 as pre-
viously it had provided for removal of state prosecutions for acts done in the capacity
of a federal revenue officer. The states had shown an inability or unwillingness to
protect the interests committed to their protection by the Constitution; now consti-
tutional means had been forged or found to permit a more powerful protector to
act. Nothing new in principle is added when it becomes criminal in 191o to trans-
port a woman in interstate or foreign commerce for immoral purposes,'12 and in
i919 to transport a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce.3 National pro-
hibition perhaps marks the zenith of this movement; but even as it was laid to rest
Congress pushed on with new penal laws in the 193o's directed at kidnaping,
extortion, use of firearms, and many forms of theft,' 4 creating when necessary extra-
ordinary presumptions to support federal jurisdiction, e.g., that the victim of a kid-
naping has been transported in interstate commerce if he has not been released
within seven days,' 5 and that a firearm was received in interstate commerce after
GI STAT. 29, 46 (1789).
6 1 STAT. X12 (790). This act also contained a general penal code for federal territories, within
which Congress exercises a complete sovereign rather than a limited federal legislative jurisdiction.
74 STAT. 115, 117-118 (1825).
814 STAT. 27 (z866); 16 STAr. 140, 144 (1870); see i8 U. S. C. §§5i and 52(0940).
9 17 STAT. 283, 302, 323; see i8 U. S. C. §§334, 336, 338 (1940).
10 12 STAT. 756 (1863); see 28 U. S. C. §74 (1940).
21 4 STAT. 633 (1833); See 28 U. S. C. §76 (1940).
1236 STAT. 825 (91o), 18 U. S. C. §398 (1940).
23 41 STAT. 324 (1919), i8 U. S. C. §408 (1940).
", See symposium on the criminal legislation of the Seventy-third Congress, x LAW & Covsamjp.
PRO. 399 et seq. (1934); Conboy, Federal Criminal Law, in LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 295 (1937).
1 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U. S. C. §4o8a (1940).
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the effective date of the Federal Firearms Act, if found in the possession of a
defendant, previously convicted of a crime of violence1
The gradual assumption of the power to punish for ordinary crimes proceeded
concurrently with a great expansion of the role of the central government in many
public-welfare fields. Interstate transportation, communication, and power distri-
bution, the wholesomeness and proper labeling of food, the marketing of grain and
securities, wages and hours of labor, the hunting of migratory game, and in wartime
the price and distribution of nearly all commodities, were subjected to federal regu-
lation. Nearly always the requirements of these regulatory measures were backed by
criminal sanctions.
Thus federal criminal jurisdiction is being employed in three different ways:
(i) to punish anti-social conduct of distinctively, if not exclusively, federal concern;
(2) to punish conduct of local concern, with which local enforcement authorities
are unable or unwilling to cope; and (3) to secure compliance with federal ad-
ministrative regulations. 7 It will be apparent in the ensuing discussion that these
categories are not mutually exclusive; the most that can be said is that a particular
federal criminal statute falls largely or primarily under one rather than another
of these headings. It is the thesis of this article that federal criminal jurisdiction
is an institution well adapted to the first use mentioned above, that it has been
employed indiscriminately in the second category, and that a new federal court
of inferior jurisdiction is needed to handle the considerable volume of petty offenses
in category three. It will be urged that the proper employment of the federal court
in the criminal field requires the recognition and practice of a much broader dis-
cretion by United States attorneys to turn over to state authorities persons who, by
the same conduct, violate local laws as well as national laws intended to be auxiliary
to local enforcement.
FEDERAL "SELF-DEFENSIVE" CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
There would be small profit in debating at this point in our history the ques-
tion, "Shall we abolish federal criminal jurisdiction?" The institution's permanence
is assured not only by the inertia of long tradition, but also by notable recent
successes against traitors, kidnapers, racketeers, communists) and others against
whom public indignation is easily aroused. We may, however, explore with profit
the extent to which federal prosecutors should invoke federal criminal jurisdiction,
for, with the present arsenal of federal criminal statutes, the discretion of the De-
partment of Justice is replacing the command of C6ngress in determining the work-
ing line between federal and state enforcement activities. The United States district
is 52 STAT. 1250 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §902(f) (1940). This presumption was invalidated in Tot
v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943).
"' Cf. a somewhat similar classification in AR'zxUR C. MILLSPAL'GH, CRIME CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT 291 (Brookings Inst., 1937).
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attorney can generally find some federal hold on a situation. What are the con-
siderations which lead him to act or to withhold his hand?
Given the federal criminal court, the strongest case for the exercise of its power
can be made in the category of offenses which undermine the court itself or the gov-
ernmental authority which the court represents. Thus few would question the
propriety of federal punishment of treason, espionage, contempt of court, bribery of
federa officials, resistance or obstruction to federal process, interference wtith
recruiting, or defrauding the revenue. This is the oldest and best established branch
of federal criminal jurisdiction. Important values in terms of prestige of the central
authority are involved. The pomp and power of a court are potent symbols behind
which to rally the allegiance of masses of people who might otherwise have difficulty
envisioning a more remote and intangible sovereign. ". . . to surround the Consti-
tution with more ramparts and to disconcert the schemes of its enemies," wrote
Hamilton, urging extension of the federal judiciary, "the proper measures to be
adopted [are] ... First, establishments which will extend the influence and promote
the popularity of the government. . . ."" A powerful federal court would bring
federal authority and law "closer to the feelings, understanding and affection of all
citizens."1" The extent to which the prestige of the federal system continues to rest
upon the institution of the federal court in this day may be doubted. The armed
forces, the income-tax collector, the post office, social security, and federal highways
bring home to Everyman the strength and permanence of the central government.
Perhaps present-day federal courts derive their prestige from the government rather
than create it for the parent organization. But whether as an attribute of the court
or of the government, this symbolic value of a federal criminal tribunal is clearly at
its maximum in what might be called the self-defensive prosecutions by the federal
government.
Moreover, in relation to such prosecutions there are valid administrative con-
siderations which favor a separate federal tribunal. If genuinely national interests
are at stake, the controversies should not have to compete with local breaches of the
peace crowding the calendar of a county court of quarter sessions. The judge who
determines these controversies should be able to give them the time and consideration
appropriate to matters of such gravity. He should be a specialist in devising solutions
that grow out of an understanding of national objectives and a national point
of view. The exigencies of the Department of Justice are also to be considered. It
is easier to prepare cases for eighty-four district courts, now operating under uniform
rules of criminal procedure, than to conduct proceedings in thousands of courts
operating under scores of procedural codes.
The possibility of conflict between local and national interests must also be
is io H.nLON (Lodge ed.) 329, quoted in Warren, Federal Crininal Laws and the State Cotrts,
38 H-iv. L Rav. 545, 558, fl. 36 (1925).
"9Warren, supra note A8, at 561, quoting the Washington Federalist in the debate over the Judiciary
Act of x8ox.
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envisioned, and provision must be made for resolving such conflicts by representatives
of national authority if national law is to remain paramount. Possible local nulli-
fication of federal law was one of the Federalists' arguments for a strong national
judiciary:
The most discerning could not foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit might be
found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes; whilst every
man may discover, that courts constituted like those of some of the States would be im-
proper channels of the judicial authority of the Union. State Judges, holding their offices
during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for
an inflexible execution of the national laws. 20
It is an argument which Congress has accepted as ground for broadening federal
criminal jurisdiction at each of the recurrent states'-rights crises in our history.
It may seem paradoxical that trial in a federal court should be effective to counter
local resistance against federal law. Federal judge, jury, and prosecutor come from
the same area and social groups from which the state court draws its personnel.
Yet the very fact of employment by the central government seems to shift the
center of loyalty and to modify or restrain local attitudes. There is a kind of esprit
de corps uniting men to the organization to which, if only for the time being, they
belong, that causes a juryman to react differently in the federal court than he would
in his county courthouse across the street.2
1
Despite the considerations of national prestige, administrative convenience, and
possible local obstruction, which justify reserving in the central government a power
to act against anti-federal conduct, it does not follow that al conduct which ad-
versely affects the federal organization must be dealt with in the federal courts.
Early Congresses frequently relied on state courts to enforce penalties under federal
revenue laws, and the doctrine that it is "inherently impossible" for the courts of
one sovereign to enforce the penal laws of another as applied to the relations between
Federal and state governments has been exploded by the removal cases. Theft of
federal property is a federal offense, but it is also punishable by the states.P Clearly
federal prosecution would be in order against a conspiracy, perhaps with the con-
20 9 HA.mILTOn (Lodge ed.) 506, quoted in i E. N. ZOLINE, FEDERAL CRIINAL LAW & PROCEDURE
(ig2z), Introd. p. x.
1 See Mr. Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 158-159
(945): "The Government further urges that, since prosecutions must be brought in the district where
the crime was committed, the judge and jurors of that locality can be depended upon to protect against
federal interference with State law enforcement. . . If federal and State prosecutions are subject to the
same influences, it is difficult to see what need there is for taking the prosecution out of the hands of the
State. After all, Georgia citizens sitting as a federal grand jury indicted and other Georgia citizens
sitting as a federal trial jury convicted Screws and his associates; and it was a Georgia judge who charged
more strongly against them than this Court thinks he should have." Cl. evidence of the fairness of
state court decisions on federal questions. Warren, supra note x8, at 569, 584 et seq.; Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity lurisdiction, 41 HA.v. L. krv. 483, 492 et seq. (1928).
" Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1879); see Warren, supra note x8, at 576 et seq.
"' State v. Stevens, 6o Mont. 390, 405, 599 Pac. 256 (592i); State v. Frach, 162 Ore. 6o2, 94 P.
2d 143 (1939).
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nivance of federal officials, to steal federally owned war surplus commodities held
in warehouses throughout the country. Public confidence in the integrity of the
distribution processes of the War Assets Administration is challenged. The Attorney
General's purpose to vindicate federal authority would be hampered by any necessity
to pursue the offenders through a number of local larceny prosecutions, and the de-
terrent effect would be considerably weakened. The federal property crimes, how-
ver, reach far beyond such cases. Knowledge that the property belongs to the United
States is not required,2 4 and one can imagine extreme applications of federal juris-
diction: a burglar ransacking the suburban home of a federal official takes a brief
case belonging to the government; a pickpocket snatches a wallet containing OPA
gasoline ration coupons. 5 The dearth of such cases in the federal reports would
indicate some common-sense self-restraint by federal prosecutors in invoking the
sweeping power of federal theft legislation.
A situation intermediate between that of theft directed against the United States
and theft which fortuitously involves United States property is presented by the
stealing of mail matter28 Here the principal victim is the owner of the article
stolen, not the United States, although the Government has an interest as bailee
sufficient to support an indictment for stealing federal property2 7 The amount may
be petty and the activity completely local. No regional obstruction of national policy
is to be anticipated, and federal prestige is hardly staked on the conviction of a mail
pilferer. Our standards may nevertheless imply the desirability of federal prosecution
if small thefts are so numerous as to place a substantial operating burden on the
postal system in tracing lost articles, or as to require expensive preventive measures.
To protect the carrying out of this federal function may require coordinated enforce-
ment efforts during which the cases should be singled out from other petty maraud-
ing for treatment in the tribunal of national concern. The penalty may be gauged
by the special standard of reference to the needs of the federal system rather than by
the value of the stolen property.
Another illustration of federal offenses which combine aspects of "self-defense"
of the federal organization or function with the possibility of application to conduct
containing very little of federal significance is impersonation of federal officials.28
" The point seems rarely if ever to have been raised. See United States v. Kambeitz, 256 Fed. 247,
255 (N. D. N. Y. i919), af'd, 262 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 2d 1919) (defendant stole furs and dresses from
a railroad express shipment while railroads were being operated by the United States); Thompson v.
United States, 256 Fed. 616 (C. C. A. 2d i919) (defendant stole fifteen sacks of sugar from a river
barge; United States ownership established by testimony of refiner's manager identifying this sugar from
company records and code marks on the sacks as having been allocated to meet a requisition by the
United States); Norris v. United States, 152 F. 2d 8o8 (C. C. A. 5 th x946) (federal game warden
robbed of auto belonging to United States). Note in each of these cases the element of interference with
some governmental function in addition to mere proprietorship.
" Under the regulations such coupons remained the property of the Office of Price Administration
even after issuance. See Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 588 (1946).
na35 STAT. 1125 (igo9), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §317 (1940).
"United States v. Kambeitz, supra note 24.
" Sec. 32 of the Criminal Code, 52 STAT. 83 (1938), 18 U. S. C. §76 (940).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
A multiplication of cases of false assumption of federal authority may lead to a
skepticism regarding credentials of genuine federal officers and may impede them in
the exercise of their duties. Activities of impostors may also breed disrespect for
federal authority. A power to prevent such consequences must be lodged in the
federal authority, for reasons analogous to those applicable to postal depredation. "
The impersonation statute, however, is dratfed in terms as appropriate to private
cheat as national menace. It permits a prosecution like Little v. United States,"°
where the defendant, responding to a matrimonial advertisement by a widowed
rooming-house keeper, bilked her of $30 lodging, $7 spending money, and a $60o
loan on the representation, among others, that he was a United States Secret Service
operative. A discreet prosecution policy in the light of the special function of the
federal forum would -have drawn the line well short of this case.
II
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AUXILIARY TO STATE ENFORCEMENT
There is even more reason for restraint in creating and exercising federal criminal
jurisdiction auxiliary to state law enforcement. To enlist the federal power in the
battle against obscenity, lotteries, iheft, alcoholism, and prostitution is not to protect
federal prestige but to hazard it; it does not solve federal administrative problems
but creates new ones; it does not vindicate federal authority in matters of distinctively
national concern against possible local obstruction, but steps into local issues. Federal
intervention also has a tendency to weaken the enforcement efforts of state authori-
ties.?' If, nevertheless, national intervention is necessary, such intervention should
proceed with an understanding of the disadvantages of dual state and federal crimi-
nal systems, disadvantages which are at their maximum when the federal law is
employed to supplement local enforcement. The intervention, moreover, will b
haphazard and arbitrary until' there is full comprehension of the auxiliary role of
the federal government; ie., until we cease to regard the jurisdictional circumstance,
which gives the United States power to act, as' the "gist" of the federal offense.
A. Anomalies of Dual Jurisdiction
Were we not inured to the irrationalities which permeate our criminal law
generally, the anomalies in its administration resulting from a dual judicial system
would long ago have gained notoriety surpassing that of Swift v. TysonY2  Sub-
stantially the same activities may be successively punished by both state and federal
governments,.3  although presumably the sentence imposed by each sovereign is
29 See United States v. Lepowich, 318 U. S. 702 (1943).
z'69 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 9th 19og).
See statement of Attorney General Mitchell, quoted in Hall, Federal Anti-TheJt Legilation, I LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 424, 432 (1934).
32 x6 Pet. I (U. S. 1842).
" Crossley v. California, x68 U. S. 640 (1898) (murder by derailing United States mail train);
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deemed by its legislature and courts appropriate to deter, reform, or incapacitate the
offender. The dual jurisdiction has resulted in the so-called detainer system. A
state prosecuting official, for example, will notify a federal warden that a prisoner
is wanted for local prosecution after he has served his federal sentence. This prose-
cution may be for conduct which the federal judge took into account in imposinig
sentence, or even the identical conduct which was the subject of federal indict-
ment. Parole authorities refuse to grant parole to prisoners against whom such
detainers have been filed. Prisoner morale is undermined by knowledge of this
practice and expectation of further imprisonment, with disastrous effect upon any
program of reformation. Detainers are sometimes lodged with no real intention of
prosecuting but solely to prevent parole. 4
Only two significant limitations of the double punishment possibilities appear.
One is a judicial doctrine restraining the states: they may not punish non-compliance
with standards of conduct which conflict with those prescribed by Congress! 5 The
other is a legislative restraint on federal action: in connection with a few of the
greatest extensions of federal jurisdiction over property offenses it has been provided
that
A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a
bar to prosecution hereunder for the same act or actsa
Absent such provision, acquittal in the courts of one system will not bar prosecution
in the tribunals of the other system for the same transaction, 7 although within each
system immunity from double jeopardy ranks high among-the traditional liberties
of Anglo-American justice.
The dual court system and the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction in the
"auxiliary" field harbor not only the possibilities of double trials and double punish-
ment, but also problems of inequality of treatment of like offenders. Generally,
duplicate prosecutions do not take place, although they are technically possible. A
choice between federal and state action is made by the prosecuting authority. The
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926) (illegal possession of alcoholic liquor). But cf. Puerto Rico
v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253, 264 et seq. (1937) (duplicate prosecution under territorial law barred since
both laws emanate from same sovereign). Concurrent state jurisdiction is expressly provided for by
Sec. 326 of the Criminal Code, 35 STAT. 1151 (i9o9), 18 U. S. C. §547 (1940), which is carried
forward in Sec. 3231 of the proposed Revision of the Criminal Code, H. R. 3190, 8oth Cong., ist Sess.
(1947): ". • • nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of
the several states under the laws thereof."
., See criticism of this system by United States District Judge Carroll C. Hincks, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons James V. Bennett, and others in Federal Probation, reprinted in The New
Era, Fall, 1945, P. 2oet. seq.
'
1 Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220 (1903) (reevg state conviction of national bank officer for receiving
deposits after 'insolvency); State v. Thornton, 171 Minn. 466 (1927).
" Larceny of goods in interstate or foreign commerce, 37 STAT. 670 (1913), as amended, 'x8 U. S. C.
§410 (1940). Train wrecking, 54 STAT. 255, 18 U. S. C. §412a (1940). Theft and embezzlement by
officers of interstate and foreign carriers, 38 STAT. 733 (1914), 18 U. S. C. §412 (1940).
"United States v. Barnhart, 22 Fed. 285 (C. C. Ore. 1884) (acquittal in state court of a white man
for murder of Indian no bar to prosecution in the feddal court for killing the Indian on an Indian
reservation).
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choice will be significant to the defendant procedurally. For example, in the federal
court he will have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses from any-
where in the United States.38 The federal prosecutor, on the other hand, will find
it easy to remove a defendant from place of arrest to place of trial under federal
Criminal Rule 4o,'9 as compared with the state prosecutor's necessity of resorting to
interstate rendition. The defendant will find in the federal criminal courts an
unusual solicitude to protect him against extra-judicial confessions secured by illegal
methods of federal officials. 40 But prosecution in the federal court will make avail-
able against him information, illegally obtained by state officers, which for that
reason might not have been admissible against him in the state court. The privilege
against self-incrimination and the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures, protected within each system against encroachment by agents of that
system, lose their efficacy when the invasion comes from one set of officials but is
availed of by the other.4 The Supreme Court of Michigan in a very recent case seems
to have been the first to recognize the mockery of this kind of privilege against self-
incrimination in an era when criminal conduct is so likely to offend both federal and
state law.42
More striking than the procedural variations is the effect of the choice of forum
on the penalty which may be imposed. It may mean the difference between life and
death, as under the federal kidnaping statute which authorizes the death penalty
for an offense which in many states is not capital.43 Fornication, if criminal at all,
is rarely punished by the states. Let the defendant transport his mistress across the
state boundary and he becomes subject to the five-year penalty of the Mann Act."
Similar differences of treatment depending on the choice between federal and state
prosecution occur in connection with federal legislation against the mailing of
obscene or indecent matter or lottery advertisements. Indeed, these federal offenses
may include some activities entirely lawful under state law, as where games of
chance or dissemination of information on contraception has been legalized.
It will be objected against the foregoing analysis that procedural variations and
inequalities of treatment are the natural consequence of the fact that the defendant's
"FED. R. Crum. P. 17, 18 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1946), following §687.
09 Ibid.
'
0 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
"xUnited States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (193). (The opinion refers to the similar British
rule which does not protect against compulsory disclosure of offenses violating laws "of another country.")
Hale v. Henkel, 2o U. S. 43 (19o6); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905).
"'People v. Den Uyl, 29 N. 1V. 2d 284 (Mich. 1947).
4"C. 5o STAT. 304 (x937), x8 U. S. C. §542 (1940), authorizing the federal court to designate
another state for execution "if the laws of the State within which the sentence is imposed make no
provision for the infliction of the penalty of death .. "
4 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. §398 (1940). Although this act was passed to enable the
Federal Government to reach organized interstate prostitution, its application to isolated or essentially local
offenses is possible and not infrequent. Caminetti v. United States, 238 U. S. 636 (1915); Unitcd States
v. Reginelli, 133 F. 2d 595 (C. C. A. 3d 1943), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 783; ct. Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U. S. 14 (1946); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U. S. 369 (1944).
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conduct gave rise to two separate causes of action, whereas the essential evil of
the "federal common law" sponsored by Swift v. Tyson was that a plaintiff with a
single cause of action was given power to choose a favorable forum. Neither the
federal nor the state prosecutor has such a choice; each proceeds in his own tribunal
for an offense committed against his own sovereign. This view has prevailed in the
double-jeopardy cases previously discussed. A more realistic concept might be that
federal and state prosecutors are, at least in the area of "auxiliary" federal criminal
law, merely alternative instruments evolved by the American community for the
purpose of deterring certain types of anti-social conduct or of reforming or incapaci-
tating those who engage in such conduct. The community acts through its state
organization where this is feasible, or, if the matter is beyond the effective control
of that organization, through its national agencies and institutions. Treatment of
the offender ought not to differ depending on the agency employed to administer the
treatment. This is not to suggest that penalties under federal law be made to con-
form to those prescribed for cognate offenses under local codes. The point is only
that the difference in treatment of similar conduct depending on whether state or
federal government prosecutes is an additional reason for working out procedures-
under which the states handle as many as possible of the offenses which do not
involve a substantial federal interest. Where a true federal concern is involved, the
significance of the defendant's transgression is changed, thereby justifying distinc-
tions in penalty from local misconduct, as well as some national uniformity of
treatment by the federal courts.
B. Criteria for Limiting Employment of Federal Criminal
Laws Auxiliary to State Enforcement
Considering the vices of dual criminal jurisdiction, it is important to develop
definite criteria for limiting the number of federal prosecutions under criminal
laws which are merely auxiliary to state law enforcement. The Criminal Division
of the Department of Justice must work these out in detail for each offense, but in
general it can be said that federal action is justified in the presence of one or more
of the following circumstances: (I) When the states are unable or unwilling to
act; (2) when the jurisdictional feature, e.g., use of the mails, is not merely incidental
or accidental to *the offense, but an important ingredient of its success; (3) when,
although the particular jurisdictional feature is incidental, another substantial federal
interest is protected by the assertion of federal power; (4) when the criminal
operation extends into a number of states, transcending the local interests of any
one; (5) when it would be inefficient administration to refer to state authorities a
complicated case investigated and developed on the theory of federal prosecution. 5
The following paragraphs illustrate the varying extent to which these considerations
seem to influence federal prosecution policy.
5 The analysis is drawn in part from a memorandum by Professor Herbert Wechsler of the Co-
lumbia University Law School.
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Frustration of state law enforcement by the territorial limitations on the authority
of its officers is an obvious occasion for federal assistance. The Federal Fugitive
Felon Act lays the basis for such assistance by making it unlawful to move across
state lines to avoid prosecution by a state for certain relatively serious offenses, or to
avoid testifying in state felony proceedings.4" This law was intended to provide a
jurisdictional basis for FBI assistance in apprehending the fugitive (since the Bureau
can investigate only federal crimes), and to facilitate removal (at federal expense) of
the defendant to the .jurisdiction from which he has fled. In view of this it has al-
ways been the policy of the Department of Justice to authorize complaints under this
act only at the instance of state authorities and to release the defendant to state au-
thorities after removal. Only rarely. would federal prosecution be appropriate under
this "auxiliary" statute. Yet it has been invoked against a New Jersey doctor who in
New Jersey removed identifying scars of a burglar fugitive from North Carolina, on
the theory that the doctor was an accessory after the fact to the federal felony of
interstate flight.47 And a fugitive witness, who might have been punishable by the
state only for contempt, recently received a four-year sentence under circumstances
suggesting that the penalty was related to a crime for which he had been given im-
munity in the state proceedings4
The mail fraud statute is a more typical case of federal intervention based on
several of the criteria mentioned at the head of this section. A promoter in a
western mining state mulcts a nation-wide "sucker list" year after year by fraudulent
representations as to the amount of "probable" ore in a mine or by cleverly condi-
tional promises of dividends in the near future. His neighbors, more sophisticated
in the mores of mining promotion than distant farmers and urbanites, are unlikely
to be victimized, and inclined to be tolerant of "representations of opinion" or
"piomises" when 'asserted as a basis for criminal liability or extradition. The
scattered victims, on the other hand, have little leverage with which to secure action
from their home auihorities." Individual losses may be small, the expense of extra-
dition heavy, the burden of proof as to likdlihood of dividents from a mine
thousands of miles away beyond the capacity of the county prosecutor. Here federal
prosecution would be appropriate not only because of state inability to deal with the
situation, but because the abuse of the mail privilege is an inherent element of the
scheme. Such frauds could hardly operate except through this federally supported
means of communication. The central government, therefore, assumes a responsi-
4 48 STAT. 782 (1934), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §4oe (1940). See Toy and Shepherd, The Prob-
lem of Fugitive Felons and Witnesses, i L~w & CON r M. PaoB. 415 (1934).
"'United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F. 2d 656 (C. C. A. 3 d 1944) (conviction reversed on ground
that "burglarly," as used in the Fugitive Felon Act, meant common-law burglarly only. This prosecution
can be und&rstood onlk' in the light of Brandenburg's previous successful encounters with the law and his
ultimate capitulation in a federal narcotics prosecution in which entrapment was the chief legal issue.
United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F. 2d 98o (C. C. A. 3d 1947).
48 Hemans v. United States, 163 F. 2d 228 (C. C. A. 6th 1947). Perhaps occasional prosecutions are
necessary to preserve the fiction that it is indeed the "peace of the United States" that is involved. C1.
Pollock, King's Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 Htav. L. REv. 177 (1900).
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bility that the facilities which it furnishes shall not be abused and that fraud shall not
be subsidized by cheap federal means of dissemination. It will be recalled in this
connection that punishing the user of the mails evolved as a supplement to the
postmaster's administrative duty and discretion not to carry noxious articles. To
employ the mail fraud statute here is not only to supplement state action against
fraud but to support and protect a federal function.
But the mail fraud statute may also be used where state action is frustrated only
by the corruption of state officials, and where use of the mails is an unintended
and remote incident of the scheme. Thus Leche v. United States?9 and Hart
P. United States-" were cases of ordinary local political graft in the sale of property
to the State of Louisiana at exorbitant prices, with the connivance of the governor
and other officials. Federal jurisdiction rested upon the fact that checks for the
proceeds of the frauds were deposited in banks other than those upon which they
were drawn. The banks of deposit forwarded the checks for collection from the
drawee bank, by mail. The fraud was local in its execution and effect; the offehders
were within reach of state process, and state law was adequate to the situation. But
the defendants' dominance over the state government gave them immunity until the
federal government intervened. Nevertheless, there was considerable resentment
against this "interference with purely domestic affairs of the State," especially at the
suggestion that the mail fraud statute might be used to police the Louisiana state
primary election, on the theory that a dishonest election would result in defrauding
the state of the salary which it would pay to an improperly chosen official."
It is not surprising that hostility to federal intervention should be strongest when
explosive race-relations issues are also involved; witness the savage congressional
battles over the proposed anti-lynching legislation and the resistance to the appli-
cation of the civil rights sections of the Criminal Code to punish official brutality
against Negroes, where local prosecutors refuse to actY2  Screws v. United States
was such a case.5 A Georgia county sheriff beat to death a Negrio whom he pir-
ported to be arresting. The sheriff was convicted under Section 20 of the federal Crim-
inal Code, which makes it a crime under color of state law willfully to deprive any
inhabitant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the federal
Constitution and laws. Four members of the Supreme Court were satisfied that
the Act covered the facts, but voted for reversal of the conviction because the trial
49 118 F. 2d 246 (C. C. A. 5 th 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 617, rehearing denied, 314 U. S.
712 (1941).
UO 112 F. 2d 128 (C. C. A. 5th 1940), cert. denied, 311 . U. S. 684.
"' Cf. United States v. Aczel, 219 Fed. 917 (D. Ind. 1915), al'd, 232 Fed. 652 (C. C. A. 7th 1916).
See 86 CONG. RMe. 720, 2557 (1940) (Senator Pepper): "I proclaim it as the privilege of a State in a
democratic Government even to have bad government, if its people want it to be bad .. " See also
Johnston, They Sent a Letter, The Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1940, p. 29, col. i, pointing out that
Louisiana grafters, as a result of the Federal Government's imprisonment of Capone on income tax
fraud, had reported their unlawful gains thinking thereby to exclude any possibility of federal action.
" The civil rights legislation also serves a purpose which may properly be regarded as "self-defensive,"
e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (protection of federal election processes).
Z3325 U. S. 91 (945).
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judge failed to charge that the defendant must have had the specific purpose to
deprive the prisoner of his constitutional right to trial by court rather than by
ordeal.r Justices Rutledge and Murphy would have affirmed:
Too often unpopular minorities, such as Negroes, are unable to find effective refuge from
the cruelties of bigoted and ruthless authority. States are undoubtedly capable of punish-
ing their officers who commit such outrages. But where, as here, the states are unwilling
for some reason to prosecute such crimes the federal government must step in unless
constitutional guarantees are to become atrophied.5
Mr. Justice Roberts, with Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, thought that:
The only issue is whether Georgia alone has the power and duty to punish, or whether
this patently local crime can be made the basis of a federal prosecution. The practical
question is whether the States should be relieved from the responsibility to bring their
law officers to book for homicide, by allowing prosecutions in the federal courts for a
relatively minor offense carrying a short sentence.
They read the language and legislative history of Section 2o as conclusively against
application to a state officer who "flouts State law and is unquestionably subject to
punishment by the State for his disobedience.""7
The arguments in the Screws case evoked one of the infrequent official disclosures
of the role of prosecutor's discretion in the distribution of criminal business between
federal and state courts. The brief of the United States sought to minimize the
danger of federal displacement of state authority by demonstrating the Department
of Justice's self-restraint: !I
The Department of Justice has established a policy of strict self-limitation with regard
to prosecutions under the civil rights acts. When violations of such statutes are reported,
the Department requires that efforts be made to encourage state officials to take appro-
priate action under state law. To assure consistent observance of this policy in the en-
forcement of the civil rights statutes, all United States Attorneys have been instructed to
submit cases to the Department for approval before prosecutions or investigations are
instituted. The number of prosecutions which have been brought under the civil rights
Statutes is small.... Since 1939, the number of complaints received annually by the Civil
Rights section has ranged from 8,ooo to 14,00o, but in no year have prosecutions under
both Sections 2o and 19, its companion statute, exceeded 76....
Complaints of violations are often submitted to the Department by local law enforce-
ment officials who for one reason or another may feel themselves powerless to take action
under state law. It is primarily in this area, namely, where the official position of the
wrong doers has apparently rendered the State unable or unwilling to institute proceed-
ings, that the statute has come into operation.
5 8
" Id. at 107.
"
1Id. at 138.
" Id. at x39. Cf. Crews v. United States, x6o F. 2d 746, 747 (C. C. A. 5th 1947), affirming con-
viction on a similar set of facts: "The defendant, although guilty of a cruel and inexcusable homicide,
was indicted and convicted merely of having deprived his helpless victim of a constitutional right, under
strained constructions of an inadequate Federal statute, and given the maximum sentence under that
statute of one year in prison and a fine of $z,ooo."
t Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 142 (945).
"A1d. at 159-i6o.
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To this Mr. Justice Roberts replied:
If it be significantly true that crimes against local law cannot be locally prosecuted, it
is an ominous sign indeed. In any event, the cure is a reinvigoration of State responsi-
bility. It is not an undue incursion of remote federal authority into local duties with con-
sequent debilitation of local responsibility ...
Regard for this wisdom in federal-State relations was not left by Congress to executive
discretion.r 9
The role of discretion in the distribution of law enforcement responsibilify
between state and federal governments is therefore emerging as an important
judicial as well as political issue. The Screws case serves notice upon Congress and
the Attorney General to develop, perfect, and properly circumscribe this essential
discretion. Congress must make it plain beyond question that it does rely upon
the Attorney General's self-restraint, when it passes criminal laws that supplement
state efforts. Tle Attorney General can do much to allay the suspicion which in-
evitably clouds areas of large executive discretion, by articulating in a public and
formal fashion the criteria which guide him in exercising this discretion, not
only in civil rights cases but in all offenses against auxiliary federal ciminal
laws. A beginning, but only a beginning, has been made in the standing Instructions
to United States Attorneys, which circulate only within the Department.
C. Inadequate Statutory Formulation
of Federal Auxiliary Criminal Jurisdiction
Up to this point emphasis has been placed upon the fact that definition of federal
crime in terms of the circumstance which confers federal jurisdiction often brings
into the national courts matters which might be left to the states. It is also true,
however, that Congress has not fully exploited its constitutional powers to deal with
crime, either to protect federal interests or to supplement state forces. Preoccupied
with the jurisdictional problem, it has legislated against "use of the mails," or
"transportation in interstate commerce," rather than against fraud or theft wherever
they occur within reach of the federal power. This results in some surprising
lacunae in the federal hold on crime. The central government will move against
fraudulent schemes if the defendant "for the purpose of executing such scheme" uses
the mails in minutely specified particular ways.60 But if the culprit eschews the mails
and carries out his scheme by interstate telephone, he is exclusively in the hands of
state authorities, unless perchance the scheme involves securitiese1 or use of a
"' Id. at 16o-x6x. Cf. Mr. justice Rutledge's opinion at page 132. The recent filing of a petition with
the United Nations by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People complaining of
anti-Negro discrimination in this country and the report of the President's Committee on Civil Liberties
presage a more active role for the Federal Government in this field. Attorney General Tom C. Clark is
quoted in an Associated Press dispatch of October 27, 1947, addressing the National Association of
Attorneys General, as follows: ". . . in those instances where the States through negligence, or for what-
ever reason, fail in their obligation to protect the life and liberties of the individual citizen, we shall
move with as great vigor and force as is permitted under the law." The Washington Post, Oct. 28,
1947, P. 7, col. 5-
:o Sec. 215 of the Criminal Code, 35 STAT. 1130 (ipo9), z8 U. S. C. §338 (1940).
' Sec. 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 84, 15 U. S. C. §77q(a) (1940).
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"facility of a national securities exchange." '  Our national disapproval of lotteries
finds expression in Section 213 of the Criminal Code, punishing not the use of the
mails in furtherance of lottery schemes, as in the mail fraud statute, but only the
mailing of specific kinds of lottery material and advertisements.a This is supple-
mented by Section 214, which makes the actor's status as a postal employee the basis
of a general prohibition against his engaging in the sale of lottery tickets. Radio
broadcasting of lottery information is a federal misdemeanor."4 Importation or
interstate transportation of the same material is a felony." But it is apparently
lawful from a national standpoint to transmit lottery information by interstate
telephone or telegraph. Sellers of revolvers, forbidden to mail these weapons, mark
their sales catalogues, "Must be shipped by express.""6
Stealing is a federal offense if the property belongs to or is in custody of the
federal government6 or of a'Federal Reserve, national, or federally insured bank."s
Stealing is also a federal offense if the property moves as or is part 8f an interstate or
foreign shipment, or if the property is in the possession of an interstate carrier, or of
a person moving in interstate or foreign commerce by carrier, or if the property is
money "arising out of or accruing from" interstate or foreign transportation and is
converted by an employee of the carrier. 9 In contrast to the foregoing requirement
of possession by an interstate carrier or movement as an interstate shipment, actual
interstate transportation of the stolen articles is required under the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act7" and under the National Stolen Property Act. 1 Under the Anti-
racketeering Act the Federal Government may become the prosecutor of robbery
or extortion which in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects interstate or
foreign commerce.72
Kidnaping becomes of potential. federal concern as a result of the interstate or
foreign transportation of the victim, the statute being obviously patterned upon the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, to which the editors of the United States Code
append it.73 Jurisdiction might as easily have been rested on the use of the mails
or means of interstate commerce in connection with the kidnaping, since ransom
notes and telephone calls are a usual feature of such operations. This hiatus is
2Secs. xo and 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 891, 904 15 U. S. C. §§7 8j,
78 (a) (1940).
as 35 STAT. 1129 (2909), x8 U. S. C. §336 (1940).
"Federal Communications Act of June i9, 1934, 48 STAT. io88, 47 U. S. C. §316 (1940).
"Sec. 237 of the Criminal Code, 35 STAT. 1136 (gog), I8 U. S. C. §387 (1940).
ee44 STA. 1059 (1927), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §361 (1940). See Brabner-Smith, Firearm
Reg:lation, I LAW & CovrsiaP. PROB. 400, 405 (1934).
"'Sees. 46 and 47 of the Criminal Code, 35 STAT. 1097 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §§99 and loo (1940).
See provisions as to stealing from the mails, Secs. 192 and 197 of the Criminal Code, i8 U. S. C. §§315-
320 (940).
as48 SAT. 783 (1934), 12 U. S. C. §588a (1940): Rv. STAT. §52o9, as amended, x8 U. S. C. §592
(1940).
8537 STAT. 67o (1913), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §409(a) (10o).
704r STAT. 324 ( 919), 18 U. S. C. §4o8 (940).
71 48 STAT. 794 (1934), 18 U. S. C. §§413-4r9 (2940).
7248 S'TA. 979 (1934), as amended, i8 U. S. C. §42oa (1940).
"3 47 STAT. 326 (1932), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §408a (1940).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JuRIsDICTION AND PROSECUTORS' DIsCRETIoN 79
partially filled by the statutory provisions relating to extortion and demand for ran-
som. These fall within the federal ken if the communication is transmitted in inter-
state commerce or through the mails but, for reasons difficult to fathom, the com-
munication itself must contain the threat or demand before the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or the postal inspectors can be called in. This is the more surprising
since it was long ago held that letters on which a mail fraud count may be based
need not contain the fraudulent misrepresentation, if in fact the letter promotes the
fraudulent scheme.74 In the case of mail fraud, letters are sufficient which merely
lull the victim into a false sense of security after he has parted with his money.7
The foregoing list illustrates congressional employment of the following juris-
dictional bases for adding federal to state sanctions against undesirable conduct:
(i) use of the mails; (2) use of means of interstate commerce; (3) "affecting" com-
merce; (4) interstate transportation (a) of the victim, (b) of the proceeds, (c) of
the criminal himself; (4) radio broadcasting; (5) status of the offender as a federal
employee; (6) status of the offender as an employee of an interstate carrier; (7) use
of facilities of national securities exchanges; (8) federal ownership or custody of the
property; (9) ownership or custody of the property by institutions licensed by the
federal government or under its protection. The list can, of course, be extended
almost indefinitely with crimes resting on the tax, war, and other powers of Congress.
Enough has been said, however, to show that the use of a particular jurisdictional
circumstance in the definition of a federal crime only very crudely marks off the area
in which either (i) a substantial national interest exists or (2) the states are incapable
of effective action. The legislation reaches too far in many situations but may fall
short in a particular case despite an obvious federal interest. Attention and con-
troversy tend to focus on the jurisdictional problem rather than the substantive issues
of criminality. Federal jurisdiction may turn on the distinction between transporting
"with fraudulent intent" and mailing "for the purpose of executing a scheme to
defraud.""6 Courts find themselves talking nonsense like the oft-repeated declaration
that the use of the mails is the "gist" of the offense of mail fraud, when all that is
meant is that this federal jurisdictional element must, of course, be alleged and
proved.7" To regard mailing as the essence of mail fraud is like treating the locali-
zation of the offense in Pennsylvania as the gist of a Pennsylvania prosecution for
larceny. One example of the peculiar and artificial results of this attitude toward
federal crime is the doctrine that each use of the mails in connection with a single
"Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 3o6 (896); United States v. Berg, x44 F. 2d 173 (C. C. A.
3d 1944).
"'McNear v. United States, 6o F. 2d 861 (C. C. A. 8th 1932); United States v. Spielberger, 28 F.
Supp. 38o (NV. D. Va. 193); but cf. Merrill v. United States, 95 F. 2d 669 (C. C. A. 9 th 1938).
7 Compare Kann v. United States, 323 U. S. 88 (1944) with United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S.
379 (1946).
"United States v. Crummer, 1S F. 2d 958, 962 (C. C. A. ioth 1945), cert. denied, 66. Sup. Ct.
704 (holding scheme need not be alleged with same particularity as is required in pleading the mailing);
United States v. Lowe, ix5 F. 2d 596, 598 (C. C. A. 7th 1941), cert. denied, 3r U. S. 717; United
States v. Quimby, 5P F. 2d x67, 170 (C. C. A. 2d 193).
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scheme constitutes a separate offense, so that the limit of the federal court's power
to punish for fraud is five years multiplied by the number of different letters which
the prosecutor cares to make the subject of separate counts in the indictment." For
a single use of the mails in connection with a nationwide fraud a defendant chances
no more than five years in a federal penitentiary. Five post cards to a single victim
in connection with the sale of an automobile by false representations gives the federal
judge discretion to impose twenty-five years. An acquittal in one mail fraud trial
will not bar a subsequent trial and conviction for the same fraud based on another
letter. A count setting forth more than one mailing would be duplicitous.
Against such a background it is not surprising that a foreign court should be
misled regarding the nature of our federal penal law, to an utterly impractical result.
In Re Lamar,79 the Supreme Court of Alberta refused an American request for
extradition of Lamar for mail fraud, on the ground among others that the offense
was not within the extradition treaty. The treaty did cover fraud and false pretense,
and a request by the governor of .a state for Lamar's extradition would have been
honored. But since the national government wanted him for an offense the gist of
which was mailing, the court could find no basis for giving him up, under the
general principle of international extradition law that the offense must be punish-
able in the asylum state. Mail fraud (like other federal offenses defined by reference
to particular jurisdictional features) is a unique American penological phenomenon.
Rationalization of the federal penal code would call for definitions of federal
crimes in terms of the significant criminal conduct. The jurisdictional features
necessary to give federal authorities power to act should be brought together in a
comprehensive definition of some phrase like "within the federal jurisdiction." Such
a wholesale enlargement of federal power will, of course, be unacceptable to Congress
without an assurance of proper restraint in the exercise of the jurisdiction. Perhaps
the first evidences of a changing attitude toward federal crime can be discerned in
the pending Revision of the Criminal Code. ° The Revision abandons the present
organization of federal criminal law under captions referring to jurisdictional ele-
ments like "offenses against postal service," "offenses against foreign and interstate
commerce, .... offenses within admiralty, maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
United States." Instead there is to be an alphabetical arrangement of offenses by
nature of the conduct prohibited, e.g., arson, assault, embezzlement and theft, false
personation, lotteries, obscenity. Chapter 31 of the Revision, entitled Embezzlement
and Theft, will bring together the various provisions of federal law dealing with
these property offenses, heretofore scattered through the code under appropriate
jurisdictional headings. It was found possible to consolidate eleven different sections
"
8 Mitchell v. United States, 142 F. 2d 480 (C. C. A. roth 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 747; Bozel
v. United States, 139 F, 2d 153 (C. C. A. 6th 1943), cert. denied, 32i U. S. 8oo; Holmes v. United
States, 134 F. 2d 125 (C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 776. The practice has been disap-
proved. United States v. Steinberg, 62 F. 2d 77, 78 (C. C. A. 2d 1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 729
(but court held without power to interfere).
192 Western Weekly Report 471, 477 (Supreme Court of Alberta 1940).
80H. R. 3190, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
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into one The juxtaposition of the remaining sections revealed the need for uni-
formity of definition and penalties8 2 Robbery and burglary offenses-within federal
territorial jurisdiction, of federal property, from federally protected banks, in a post
office, or in a railroad car carrying interstate shipments-are assembled in Chapter
1o3. However, within the chapters the individual identity of the offenses is largely
preserved, e.g., transportation, mailing, and broadcasting of lottery matter remain
distinct offenses and existing penalty variations depending on which jurisdictional
element is invoked are retained. It will still be no federal offense to use the interstate
telephone and telegraph for lottery purposes.
I91
PErrY OFFsEs AND THE UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER
Few are aware of the extent to which the federal courts are occupied with petty
offenses that would be handled by magistrates or police courts in the state systems.
Petty offenses are defined in the federal Criminal Code as those for which the penalty
does not exceed confinement in a common jail, without hard labor, for a period of
six months, or a fine of not more than $5oo, or both.I Such offenses may be prose-
cuted on complaint, and tried summarily without a jury if Congress so provides, at
least where the offense is "malum prohibitum."' 4 Among the federal offenses which
fall within this category are: violations of the statutes regulating hunting and con-
servation of migratory game, 5 unauthorized manufacture, sale, oq possession of
federal official insignia, unauthorized wearing of uniform of the armed services or of
a federally incorporated veterans organization, fraudulent use of the emblems of the
Red Cross or of the 4 -H Clubs," enticing workers away from a federal armory
87
petty cheating of the post office and violation of postal regulations.88 Federal judges
and prosecutors are often reluctant to employ the federal district courts for such
cases. It has seemed to them inconsistent with the dignity of the national tribunal
to thrust upon it the duties of a justice of the peace, as in the case of violation of the
game laws, or to invoke the mighty force of the Union to assess small fines.8 9 This
" H. REP. No. 304 on H. R. 3190, 8oth Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
"Reviser's notes on §§641, 645, 659 in H. tEu. No. 304 on H. R. 3190, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (x947).
"46 STAT. 1029 (1930), x8 U. S. C. §541 (1940).
"Schick v. United States, x95 U. S. 65 (1904) (proceeding for statutory penalty for violating
Oleomargarine Act; jury trial waived); but cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63 (1930) (hold-
ing reckless driving malum in se, requiring jury trial). See Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by jury, 39 HA, v. L. REV. 917, 975 et seq. (1926).
as 40 STAT. 755 (xgx8), as amended, x6 U. S. C. §703 (1940); 45 STAT. 1222 (1929), x6 U. S. C.
§715 (1940); 48 STAT. 452 (1934), 16 U. S. C. §718 (1940).
"These provisions are conveniently assembled in Chapter 33 of the pending Revision of the Criminal
Code, H. R. 3190, 8oth Cong., Ist Sess. (947). See H. REP. No. 304 for cross references to existing
sections.
"' Sec. 43 of the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. §95 (1940).
"See Chapter 83 of the pending Revision of the Criminal Code.
"s See NATIONAL CoMMISION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT NO. 2 ON THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE PROmBrrTON LAWS OF TErE UNITED STATES (193x), H. R. Doc. No. 722, 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. 56 (1931). See also REPORT No. 8 o- CRIMINAl PROCEDURE 7-8 (U. S. Government Printing
Office 1931).
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becomes more serious when the attitude manifests itself against prosecution of minor
violations of federal regulatory measures which do not technically fall within the
definition of petty offenses, e.g., violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,00 the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,1 the stowaway laws, 2 or the Emergency
Price Control Act?3
Following a study of the petty offensel problem under prohibition, President
Hoover endorsed legislation recommended by the National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, to define "casual or slight violations," which the
district attorney might prosecute on complaint, limiting punishment as in the present
definition of petty offenses. Such complaints would be heard by the United States
Commissioner as an arm of the district court. The Commissioner would accept
pleas, hold hearings, and report cases to the district judge for sentence. The accused
might, if conviction were recommended, demand jury trial in the district court, but
in that event he subjected himself to the normal penalties for violating the statute.0"
Nothing came of these recommendations except the enactment of the petty offense
definition previously mentioned. The principal function of the United States Com-
missioner under the present statutes is that of committing magistrate.05 In recent
years the statutes creating various national parks have authorized the federal district
courts to designate commissioners to try violations of the park regulations and other
petty offenses committed in the parks.0 In 1940 Congress took another short step
in the direction of establishing federal police courts when it enacted that any United
States Commissioner specially designated for that purpose by the court might, upon
consent of the defendant, try petty offenses committed within, the exclusive or con-
current federal jurisdiction. 7 As in the case of the park commissioners, conviction
by the Commissioner may be appealed to the district court.
It is to be expected and hoped that the Commissioner's power to deal with petty.
offenses will be expanded along the lines indicated in the Wickersham Commission
recommendations. Recent English development has gone much further, to the
extent of making serious offenses triable summarily on consent of the defendant.08
Nor is there occasion for shock at the proposal to entrust to the federal prosecutor
go52 STAr. io69 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §2x6 (1940), maximum penalty for second offender six months
imprisonment or $So,ooo fine.
9152 STAT. 1043, 21 U. S. C. §333(a) (1940).'
9554 STAT. 3o6 (1940), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §469 (1940).
9156 STAT. 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §925 (Supp. 1946).
"SUPPLEmENTAL REPORT ON OSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRomrrio (1929), in H. R.
Doc. No. 252, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1931).
s 5REv. STAT. §1014 (1875), 18 U. S. C. §591 (940). See Griffin, United States Commtsiones,
29 J. Am. Jun. SoC'Y 58 (945); United States ii. MarescE, 266 Fed. 713 ( ; D. N. Y. 1920).
:0 See, for example, 16 U. S. C. §§67, 100, X72, 376 (1940).
9T54 STAT. 1058, 18 U. S. C. §576 (1940).
98The Criminal Justice Act (1925) §24. See PENAL REFOR 1N ENoLAND 56-58 (2d ed. 1946),
edited by Radzinowitz and Turner for Department of Criminal Science, Faculty of Law, Univcrsiky of
Cambridge. Included among the -offenses triable summarily are forms of larceny, malicious mischief,
perjury, and indecent assault, carrying penalties as severe as life imprisontent (e.g., larceny of -postal
packets, Sec. 12 of the Larceny Act, 1916).
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discretion to resort to a forum and procedure which limits the maximum penalty
that may be imposed. In his determination whether to prosecute at all, whether to
proceed in federal court or to remit the offense to state prosecutors, for what offenses
to prosecute, how many substantive counts to include and whether to include a con-
spiracy count, the prosecutor makes decisions of much greater significance to the
defendant, subject to no control whatsoever by the defendant and little by the court.
Moreover, the existing discretion is exercised, as it were, in camera, for no one other
than the district attorney and the defendant can judge the extent of its exercise,
whereas the present proposal involves an overt exercise of discretion.
IV
PROSECUTOR's DisCRxTION
The role which this essay assigns to the district attorney's discretion is a large one,
and it is necessary to indicate the extent to which it is consistent with our institutions.
This will be done by reviewing instances of judicial, legislative, and executive recog-
nition of the discretion, first, in relation to the institution and maintenance of crim-
inal cases generally and, second, with specific reference to the power to forego federal
prosecution where state and national jurisdiction are concurrent.
The question of the district attorney's discretionary control of criminal prosecu-
tion has arisen most often in connection with the filing of a nolle prosequi, and- the
courts have regularly refused to interfere with these voluntary dismissals of prose-
cution."9 Congress, well aware of this exercise of discretion, has never challenged
its existence even when the wisdom ofi a particular decision was under attack.
In the hearing on the confirmation of Attorney General Jackson as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, the nomination was attacked because of Jackson's failure to
prosecute Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen for criminal libel on Senator Tydings.
Jackson had taken the position that it was the policy of the Department of Justice
to avoid the criminal libel laws when the courts were open to the injured party in
civil proceedings, and that prosecutions of this character would tend to impair
freedom of the press. Republican Senator (now Mr. Justice) Burton stated:
The prosecuting attorney, being charged, as he is charged, with the great responsibility of
deciding under the laws of the United States, the laws under which he is serving, whether
a case should be prosecuted, owes a duty to himself, his community, and the Constitution
to decide whether the case should be prosecuted.... In my judgment the Attorney Gen-
eral was within his rights when he declined to prosecute, and in stating the grounds as he
did state them under the circumstances. 0
0
The Executive branch of the Federal Government has not doubted the existence
" United States v. Brokaw, 6o F. Supp. oo (S. D. Ill. 1945); United States v. Woody, 2 F. 2d 262
(D. Mont. 1924), ci. United States v. Bioff, 4o F. Supp. 497 (S. D. N. Y. 194). A prosecutor cannot
be mandamused to prosecute. Murphy v. Sumners, 54 Tex. Cr. 369, 112 S. W. 070 (1908); Graham v.
Gaither, 140 Md. 330, 1x7 At. 858 (1922).
100 87 CONG. REc. 5954, 5956 (1941). See also Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Robert H. Jackson, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 55, 58, 59-
62, 64 (104); Cf. PP. 2, 13, i5 of the Hearings (dismissl of the Spanish loyalist recruiting indictments).
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of this broad discretion in relation to prosecutions. Executive Order No. 6166 of
June 10, 1933, which, among other things, centralized the prosecuting function in
the Department of Justice, described that function as "decision whether and in what
manner to prosecute ... or to abandon prosecution." Attorney General Cummings'
opinion accompanying this executive order reviews a line of previous opinions of
Attorneys General in support of their right to pass on questions of "expediency and
propriety" in conducting the government's legal business.' ° ' The extent to which
the Department of Justice does exercise discretion in instituting prosecution
has already been noted. Administrative agencies which investigate and refer cases
to the Department of Justice for prosecution have developed quite explicit standards
for selecting cases for penal treatment. These standards naturally reflect those of the
Justice officials who have to be persuaded to proceed with the cases. Thus the
Enforcement Manual of the Office of Price Administration stated the "general
considerations" bearing on the selection of cases for criminal prosecution as follows.:
OPA cannot use the criminal remedy for wide coverage of offenders, as is done in Eng-
land, because it would unduly flood the Federal Courts. Instead, OPA must develop
techniques and criteria for choosing a relatively small number of key cases to prosecute
criminally. OPA cannot in this way punish all violators who deserve criminal penalties.
No prosecution should be recommended unless the case has clear significance for enforce-
ment beyond the administering of deserved punishment. 02
The Manual then reminded enforcement officers of alternative non-criminal sanc-
tions--e.g., injunctions, penalty suits-to be weighed against criminal proceedings in
the light of relative possibilities of success, speed of disposition, and other considera-
tions. Prosecution was to be limited to intentional or wanton violations, a stricter
standard than required by the statutory "willfulness." Among wanton and inten-
tional violators, moreover, only "strategic," or "key" cases would be prosecuted. A
case might be strategic because the violator was a leader in his industry or in a key
position economically so that his price violations tended to cause similar violations
by others.'0 3 Except for flagrant cases, OPA would recommend prosecution only for
the statutory misdemeanor under the Emergency Price Control Act or the Second
War Powers Act, although there might be a factual basis for felony charges of con-
spiracy or making false statements in matters before a federal agency.' 4
In relation to the specific question of withholding federal prosecution in favor
of state proceedings, reference may be made to the Screws opinion' 0 5 for the Depart-
ment of Justice's conception of its responsibility vis-a-vis the states for protection of
civil rights. Its policy under the Fugitive Felon Act, in favor of state action, has
also been mentioned. It is the practice to dismiss federal charges against persons
who have served or are serving adequate sentences in state institutions. " In Mann
101 38 Oss. Arry GEN. 98, ioo (1934-1937). .. OPA Enforcement Manual, Sec. 9-1702.02.
1
°Id., Sec. 9-1702.04. 10 4 rd., Sec. 9-17O2.O6. 105325 U. S. 91 (1945).
10" Cf. Sec. 9-1702.05 of the OPA Enforcement Manual: "Criminal prosecution should not be recom-
mended when a case against the same subject is pending in the state court for an infraction of state
laws related to or connected with the transaction which also involves a violation of OPA regulations ...
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Act prosecutions the district attorneys are to ask themselves, "What reasons if any
exist for thinking the ends of justice will be better served by a prosecution under
federal law than under the laws of the state having jurisdiction?" '' ° This echoes the
opinion in United States v. Ah Hung,08 a prosecution for concealing opium with
knowledge that it had been imported, in which the government relied upon the
statutory presumption of knowledge of importation. In response to the defendant's
argument that the matter was one for state action, the court said:
The federal jurisdiction is not exclusive. As in the case of the White Slave Act... the
existence of some real basis for the application of interstate commerce jurisdiction should
be considered by those officers of the government on whom rests the responsibility for
instituting prosecution.
His offense is of such a nature that it would be within the discretion of the United
States Attorney to allow it be dealt with under the health and penal statutes of the state,
regulating the welfare of the individual, rather than under interstate or foreign transporta-
tion of opium and its use as such. But [federal] jurisdiction over the case does existj1 9
There is at least one instance of legislation expressly authorizing United States
attorneys to forego federal prosecution. Following protest by Representative Dyer,
author of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, against the commitment of
hundreds of juveniles to federal institutions,"' Congress passed the Act of June i,
x932,1" l declaring its preference for local handling of juvenile delinquency cases
where jurisdiction is concurrent. The Act provides in part as follows:
For the purpose of cooperating with States ... in the care and treatment of juvenile
offenders, whenever any person under twenty-one years of age shall have been arrested
... and, after investigation by the Department of Justice, it shall appear that such person
has committed a criminal offense or is a delinquent under the laws of any State that can
and will assume jurisdiction .. .and that it will be to the best interest of the United
States and of the juvenile offender to surrender the offender to the authorities of such
State, the United States attorney of the district in which such person has been arrested is
authorized to forego the prosecution of such person and surrender him as herein pro-
vided. 1 2
The provisions in some of the federal theft legislation making conviction or acquittal
in the state courts a bar to federal prosecution may also be regarded as an indication
In those cases where the subject may be prosecuted either under the state or federal laws, there should
be close collaboration between state and federal authorities to determine the best forum for such prose-
cution." See also Sec. 9-1702.04(B): ". . . There is little significance from the general enforcement,
point of view in prosecuting the petty criminal, especially where his conduct renders him amenable to
state or federal law."
1.7 Par. 138 of Instructions to United States Attorneys, Dec. 1, 1945. But see note 44, seepra.
205 243 Fed. 762, (E. D. N. Y. x917).
...Id. at 764, 765.
20 72 CONG. REc. 2494 (1930); see Hall, Federal Anti-Theft Legislation, s Ltw & CONTErP.
Psos. 424, 428 (1934).
111 47 STAT. 301, 18 U. S. C. §662a (1940).
12 Ibid.
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of congressional sentiment in support of local responsibility.1 3 Of interest also in this
connection is Section 3231 of the pending Revision of the Criminal Code:
Offenses against the United States shall be cognizable in the district courts of the United
States, but nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of
the courts of the several states under the laws thereof. 114
This section would replace Sections 24 and 256(1) of the present Judicial Code,
which expressly make federal court jurisdiction over federal crimes exclusive.115
Perhaps proposed Section 323r is intended to open the door to a suggestion made
twenty-two years ago by Charles Warren, that state courts be employed for prosecu-
tion of federal offenses in order to reduce the work-load of the federal courts.11"
But federal prosecutors will not prosecute for federal offenses in state courts, even
if the state courts accept the jurisdiction. That has been the experience under the
few federal criminal laws which expressly provide, contrary to Section 256(1) of the
Judicial Code, that jurisdiction of the federal offense shall not be exclusively in the
federal courts11 If the purpose is to authorize discretionary relinquishment to
local tribunals, for prosecution under state law, of offenses which are only technically
but not substantially within the federal concern and jurisdiction, the matter could be
handled much more directly by amending Section 771 of the Revised Statutes, which
makes it the. "duty" of every district attorney to prosecute "all" offenses cognizable
under the authority of the United States."" The language has, of course, not been
regarded as precluding the exercise of discretion. However, if prosecutors' dis-
cretion is to be guided toward a rational coordination of federal and state criminal
jurisdiction Congress should qualify this "duty to prosecute" with a generalization
of the idea embodied in the Juvenile Delinquency Act. The language might be
somewhat as follows:
Whenever any person is charged with any offense against the United States, and it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the Department of Justice that such person has committed an
offense under the laws of any state that can and will assume jurisdiction and deal with
him according to the laws of such state, and that it will be to the best interests of the
United States to surrender such person to the authorities of such state, the United States
Attorney of the district in which such person has been arrested is authorized, subject to
the regulations and instructions of the Attorney General, to forego prosecution for the
federal offense and to surrender such person to the appropriate state authorities.
V
CoNcLusIoN
This survey points to four lines of development by which federal criminal juris-
diction can become the instrument of an intelligent national penal policy: (i) The
"a' E.g., 37 STA. 670 (1913), as amended, 18 U. S. C. §410 (1940).
"'H. R. 39o, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (947). 21 "28 U. S. C. §§4x and 37(0) (1940).
"l Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Htrmv. L. REV. 545, 597 (X925).
"17Bank robbery, 48 STAT. 783 (z934), as amended, I8 U. S. C. §588d (1940).
11 28 U. S. C. §485 (1940). The language is scheduled to be carried over substantially unchanged
in §507 of the pending revision of the Judicial Code. H. %. 3214, 8oth Cong., xst Sess. (1947).
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evolution of a broader, more uniform jurisdictional formula for federal criminal
statutes; (2) the expansion of the power of the United States Commissioners to try
petty offenses; (3) an express authorization by Congress of a general policy of re-
mitting local offenders to local authorities; (4) articulation by the Department of
Justice of a complete set of standards for the exercise of this discretion to withhold
federal prosecution. With these, the use of national courts could be confined to
matters of national import, and petty prosecutions could be segregated appropriately.
The progressive weakening of local responsibility for local law enforcement could be
halted, The new emphasis on federal-state relations might turn the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice towards a function, which it has heretofore
ignored: supplying leadership and technical counsel to state prosecuting agencies,
helping local authorities to do their own job well rather than doing it for them. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice has assumed this
role within its field of policing and detection, by subsidizing, guiding, and educating
local forces through its National Police Academy, Central Identification Records,
Technical Laboratory, Uniform Crime Reports, and other services." 9 The Bureau
of Prisons of the Department of Justice has led efforts to improve local penal insti-
tutions; it advises state prison authorities, formulates minimum standards, conducts
inspections and surveys, etc.120  The Criminal Division, too, can help reestablish
effective and responsible local law enforcement not only by intelligent restraint in
invoking federal criminal jurisdiction but more positively by developing and sponsor-
ing uniform criminal legislation, procedural reforms, aids for indigent defendants,
interstate compacts to facilitate apprehension of fugitives, and perhaps even personnel
standards covering selection, tenure, and compensation, which will strengthen the
independence of, and public confidence in, the quasi-judicial office of the prosecutor.
.. See REP. Arr'v GEm. 19" et seq. (1941).
"o See ANN. REP. FE2ERAL BUREAU OF PRusONs 37 el seq (1946).
